JESSICA KIM

Department of Sociology State University of New York at Stony Brook

Email: jessica.a.kim@stonybrook.edu

The Diffusion of International Women's Rights Norms to Individual Attitudes

The Differential Roles of World Polity and World Society

ABSTRACT Although existing studies of international women's rights norm diffusion demonstrate the importance of international linkages for fostering change, few examine their influence on individual attitudes. Of those that do, none consider how ties to different world cultural domains—world polity vs. world society—impact this process, despite their divergent roots. Whereas world polity via CEDAW facilitates diffusion by holding states accountable, world society via women's international NGOs (WINGOs) appeals to citizens by encouraging activism and awareness. Focusing on trends in developing nations, which remain underexamined but theoretically relevant, I assess the unique effect of each on diffusion to attitudes. I further expand the literature to examine the direct and interactive effects of national-level compliance (quotas) on this process. Using a multilevel analysis of World Values Survey data from 31 developing nations, I demonstrate that the duration of CEDAW ratification (world polity) and nationally mandated legislative quotas (national-level compliance) directly facilitate this diffusion, but WINGOs (world society) alone do not. Yet, where quotas exist and global ties are sufficient, WINGOs become significant, and CEDAW's effectiveness increases. These results suggest that world polity and world society are both salient for diffusion to attitudes but should be considered separately and in conjunction with national-level outcomes that moderate their effects.   KEYWORDS norm diffusion, world polity, world society, women's rights, global public opinion

From an international women's movement (Berkovitch 1999) to states' prioritization of women's rights (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Simmons 2009), scholars have demonstrated the global diffusion of women's rights norms. Yet few have examined how norms manifest in individual attitudes cross-nationally, despite the importance of public support for women's rights (Cortell and Davis 2000). Thus, it is necessary and important to understand how individual changes occur.

Existing research links diffusion to states' treaty commitments and women's organizations, which establish channels through which norms travel. Indeed, states' ratification of the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, an international treaty dedicated to gender equality) and citizens' membership in women's international NGOs (WINGOs) are instrumental in diffusion to policies and practices (Berkovitch 1999; True and Mintrom 2001). Although global institutions impact gender egalitarianism (Pandian 2018)

and women's rejection of intimate-partner violence (Pierotti 2013), this process remains undertheorized in three ways.

First, despite their unique strategies for promoting change (Cole 2017), none assess the comparative effectiveness of *state* (CEDAW) vs. *citizen* (WINGO) linkages in changing attitudes. Whereas CEDAW holds states accountable for domestic enforcement (Simmons 2009; United Nations 1979), WINGOs mobilize locals around women's issues (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; True and Mintrom 2001). Hence, these linkages are not necessarily equivalent, or equally effective. Yet research has not assessed this claim. Although WINGOs impact attitudes (Pandian 2018), CEDAW remains unexamined. Because norms diffuse through different channels, it is important to evaluate their relative effectiveness.

Second, although interactions between levels (global actors, national policies and practice, local attitudes) impact outcomes among states and individuals (Hadler 2016; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015), few studies, if any, have assessed how global ties interact with national-level compliance to impact *attitudes* toward women. Case studies find that state-level diffusion is especially effective in changing beliefs—particularly legislative quotas (Beaman et al. 2009), because they allow women to demonstrate competency in conventionally male spaces but, unlike other similar practices, are a highly visible policy response that may engender public acceptance. Yet the effect of quotas on attitudes cross-nationally is unexamined. I seek to understand the complex process of attitudinal diffusion and how national contexts temper global institutional influence.

Third, although some have studied diffusion to attitudes (Givens and Jorgensen 2013; Pandian 2018; Zhou 2013), none have examined developing nations specifically, despite evidence that they are analytically distinct (Matland 1998) and uniquely susceptible to exclusion from international non-governmental organization (INGO) networks, compared to developed nations (Beckfield 2003). Consequently, it is important to assess the distinct influence of global institutions in developing nations.

Taken together, I distinguish between state (CEDAW) and non-state (WINGOs) diffusion; pursue a more complex theoretical model examining interactions between national compliance (quotas) and global ties (CEDAW and WINGOs); and assess these processes in developing nations specifically. Using four questions from the World Values Survey (WVS) measuring women's rights endorsement, I analyze gender-egalitarian attitudes among 40,898 individuals across 31 developing nations in 2013 using multilevel modeling.[1] Although I examine just one time point and a small sample of nations due to data limitations, the WVS remains the best source of cross-national survey data on geographically diverse developing nations. Following previous studies of global beliefs (Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Pandian 2018), I use WVS data to expand the literature on women's rights diffusion to attitudes. I propose a more complex theory of diffusion that may be especially pertinent in developing nations, which substantiates cross-national diffusion as not only a top-down process differentiated by state and citizen-based ties, but also due to state policies (legislative quotas) promoting gender parity, and interactions between these two levels. In doing so, I use the theoretical

framework of sociological institutionalism, which is one approach for understanding norm diffusion.

SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Sociological institutionalism examines how nations' ties to global organizations within state and citizen-based domains—world polity and world society, respectively (Cole 2017)—facilitate global norm diffusion (Meyer et al. 1997). Across these domains, a single overarching world culture circumscribes universalistic models of appropriate behavior for legitimate actors in the global system. Drawing on these models, global organizations create institutional environments encouraging conformity with established norms, thus shaping behaviors within national settings. As a result, nations' policies and practices converge toward global norms in a top-down fashion (Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 1997). This diffusion process has been demonstrated across various phenomena (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010; Koo and Ramirez 2009; Schofer and Meyer 2005).

However, because world culture is external and highly idealized, nations with limited state resources (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2008) or poor enforcement structures (Neumayer 2007) may be *unable* to comply, leading to discrepancies between "intentions and results," or decoupling (Meyer et al. 1997:152). Yet decoupling also reflects states' *unwillingness* to conform, as they "ratify human rights treaties without being convinced of the value of ideas codified" (Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2008:121–22). As a result, internalization—the stage where norms become "taken for granted" and "no longer a matter of broad public debate"—remains incomplete (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:895). Thus, decoupling may occur in diffusion to policies and practices, but perhaps more fundamentally, to opinions and acceptance of global cultural values themselves.

Still, few examine diffusion and decoupling to attitudes cross-nationally, instead emphasizing decoupling between global norms and policy or practice (Clark 2010; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002). Although case studies show how broadly constructed norms are "localized"[2] to particular cultural contexts (Acharya 2004; Levitt and Merry 2009), they emphasize on-the-ground promotion strategies, rather than broader cross-national diffusion. Cross-national studies attribute change to economic development,[3] but highlight states' actions rather than larger transnational forces (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Others address this gap and find that world culture diffuses to attitudes about environmental concern (Givens and Jorgenson 2011, 2013; Hadler 2016), intimate-partner violence (Pierotti 2013), human rights institutions (Zhou 2013), and gender equality (Pandian 2018). Yet these studies emphasize non-state actors in world society, rather than both world society and world polity. They also combine developed and developing nations, despite evidence that developing nations should be examined separately.

At its core, world culture is fundamentally Western and typically flows from core to periphery (Meyer et al. 1997). Consequently, developing nations are the target, not the

source, of world culture. World cultural networks replicate this imbalance. Because developing nations tend to have lower capacity and fewer INGO network ties than developed nations, they are particularly susceptible to exclusion and decoupling (Beckfield 2003; Clark 2010; Paxton, Hughes, and Reith 2015). It is therefore prudent to parse out disparate world cultural effects by level of development (Matland 1998; Stockemer 2014; Viterna, Fallon, and Beckfield 2008). Although some studies do so (Bush 2011; Hughes 2009; Swiss 2016), none investigate beliefs.

I add to this small but budding institutionalist literature on attitudinal diffusion (1) to examine the effect of world culture on individual attitudes toward women (gender-egalitarian attitudes) in a theoretically relevant group of nations and (2) to pursue a more complex model of diffusion and decoupling, differentiating between state (world polity) and citizen (world society) influences and examining how diffusion at one level (policy) conditions diffusion at another (opinion). I lay out this model below, then discuss its application to existing research.

WORLD SOCIETY AND WORLD POLITY

The mechanisms of world cultural diffusion are rooted in two overlapping but distinct arenas: the intergovernmental world polity and the nongovernmental world society (Cole 2017). The former encompasses states and products of their global cooperation: intergovernmental organizations, international regimes (Krasner 1982), and international treaties. The latter contains non-state actors (citizens) and their organizational counterparts: transnational advocacy networks, norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), and INGOs (Boli and Thomas 1999). Although embeddedness in world polity (state ties to intergovernmental organizations and treaties) and world society (citizen ties to INGOs or transnational advocacy networks) produces compliance (Boli and Thomas 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998), and the domains often intersect (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), states and citizens have different motivations and mechanisms of diffusion.

States seeking legitimacy join formally binding treaties and intergovernmental organizations to acquire "reputation, trust, and credibility" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:903). Alternatively, nonstate actors mobilize around global issues, providing the channels and resources locals need to lobby their governments for rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Thus, states emphasize legitimacy and sovereignty, while nonstate actors oversee agenda-setting and norms. Compared to states, "INGOs wield authority that is informal rather than formal, cultural rather than coercive . . . [and] derive[d] from wider social and cultural *principles*" (Cole 2017:96). Moreover, world-society ties favor developed nations compared to world-polity ties, given cultural heterogeneity across societies and developing nations' exclusion from INGOs (Beckfield 2003; Cole 2017).[4] Because involvement in world polity and world society differ, the consequences of membership may vary. Consequently, international linkages' impact on diffusion will depend on linkage *type*.

Although many still conflate world polity and world society, some acknowledge this distinction to examine varying mechanisms of diffusion and discern how and under what

circumstances actors work with or against one another across domains and levels of compliance (Bromley and Cole 2016; Cole 2017). I advance this agenda in examining women's rights norm diffusion to individual attitudes.

WORLD CULTURE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS

As with all global norms, including women's rights, international linkages are critical for diffusion,[5] with ties to institutions dedicated to women's advancement being particularly useful (Berkovitch 1999; True and Mintrom 2001). In world society, WINGOs socialize locals to women's rights narratives (Keck and Sikkink 1998), mobilize around women's issues, and connect women to activist groups (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006), leading to changes in both policies and practices (Bush 2011; Swiss 2009). Although WINGOs liberalize attitudes (Pandian 2018), this association is unclear in developing nations and is particularly suspect given unequal INGO networks, which temper WINGOs' ability to reach key actors (Beckfield 2003; Hughes 2009). I thus build on existing work to examine how WINGOs influence attitudes within developing nations specifically.

In the world polity, CEDAW, a UN treaty with near-universal ratification,[6] establishes a host of women's rights and holds states formally accountable in "condemn[ing] discrimination against women in all forms" (United Nations 1979). Like WINGOs, CEDAW facilitates diffusion to policies and practices, improving women's outcomes. Though diffusion takes time, and CEDAW may have a null or negative effect, overall, CEDAW aids diffusion (Cole 2013; Englehart and Miller 2014; Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; Jacob et al. 2014; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Simmons 2009). Still, the effect of CEDAW on attitudes is undertheorized, particularly in developing nations, despite its aim to eliminate "any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women" (United Nations 1979). Thus, CEDAW should be instrumental in modifying beliefs.

In sum, world society and world polity are essential for women's rights diffusion to policies and practices, and in some cases in world society, to attitudes (Pierotti 2013; Pandian 2018). Yet further investigation must more precisely map their influence on beliefs. Though "postindustrialization" fosters gender egalitarianism, few countries have reached this stage (Bergh 2007; Ingelhart and Norris 2003), leaving the determinants of egalitarianism unaccounted for in developing nations, despite activist emphasis on them (Bush 2011; Dahlerup 2006). I therefore examine whether world culture modifies beliefs in these nations.

Moreover, because diffusion occurs "at several levels and through a variety of linkages," (Meyer et al. 1997:154; see also Acharya 2004; Chimbwete et al. 2005), I also extend the institutionalist framework to examine *interactions* between state and citizen-based mechanisms at different levels of diffusion (global scripts, national policies and practice, local attitudes). Although interactions between levels of women's rights diffusion do occur (Franceshet and Piscopo 2008; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006), to my knowledge, no cross-

national studies on attitudes or women's rights diffusion explicitly consider interaction between levels.

LEGISLATIVE QUOTAS AND INTERACTIONAL DIFFUSION

Most cross-national research on interactive diffusion examines policies or practices, where international and local activists pressure states together from above and below (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).[7] However, in some cases, these combined pressures to endorse more controversial norms such as women's rights (Towns 2010) may threaten states, which "recoil" against diffusion (Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015). For example, in Ghana, state actors deliberately blocked a marital-rape bill, despite international and local pressure (Fallon, Aunio, and Kim 2018). In contrast, in the case of individual environmentalism, national institutionalization helped bolster otherwise limited world cultural effects (Hadler 2016).

Although these studies demonstrate interactive diffusion across levels, they underemphasize how interactions socialize locals to world culture. While case studies show how global scripts are "localized" (Acharya 2004; Levitt and Merry 2009), we know little about how international and national forces interact to modify gender egalitarianism cross-nationally. I thus extend this interactive model to focus on individual attitudes, which should similarly depend on interactions between global ties and national compliance.

Though national compliance with women's rights norms manifests in many ways (e.g., women's employment, election to parliament, education), legislative quotas may be particularly effective at liberalizing attitudes.[8] Across types, quotas reserve seats for women in political bodies, thus legally mandating their access to the political realm.[9] Because women are more likely than men to support gender-specific legislation (Swers 1998; Thomas 1991), their involvement in lawmaking via quotas is crucial for passing female-friendly policies deconstructing traditional ideology. Unlike election to parliament alone, quotas establish a sizeable *threshold* of female representatives, allowing women to move beyond tokenism to establish a particularly meaningful political presence (Phillips 1995) and draw on their group consciousness *en masse* to better advocate for gender equality (Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski 2009; Celis 2007; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Despite strategic party interests or unfavorable institutional contexts hampering female legislators (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Stevenson 2000), quotas remain critical to women's rights.

Unlike informal or incremental advances such as women's election to parliament, quotas are also a uniquely visible and deliberate policy response clearly signifying state commitment. Women's election alone, even in large numbers, does not require state support. Alternatively, when states formally mandate women's participation in public positions through quotas, women's rights norms may be more easily centralized and legitimized in mainstream public discourse as female legislators demonstrate their competency and pass legislation supporting women. Thus, quotas should be instrumental in liberalizing beliefs about women's capabilities and rightful place. Consequently, scholars

World Society Linkage Promoting Women's Rights
WINGOs

World Polity Linkage Promoting Women's Rights
CEDAW duration

National Policies/Practices Promoting Women's Rights:
Legislative Quotas

Individual Attitudes Towards Women

FIGURE 1. Proposed Model of Diffusion of Women's Rights Norms to Individual Attitudes

anticipate that quotas will "reshape attitudes, values, and ideas towards women's roles" (Kittilson 2005:643).

Experimental case studies substantiate this supposition. In India, quotas reduce constituent bias about women and their capacity for political leadership (Beaman et al. 2009; Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo 2010). These findings are consistent with exposure-based explanations, which find that exposure to empowered women increases egalitarianism (Dasgupta and Asgari 2004; Kroska and Elman 2009). Although an initial "backlash" may occur (Krook 2009; Rudman and Fairchild 2004), quotas garner positive long-term effects as beliefs adapt. This suggests that in addition to direct diffusion from global to local, compliance at the national level (quotas) also diffuses norms to beliefs. Yet, few, if any, have examined this trend cross-nationally. I build on this research by evaluating quotas' direct and moderating effects on diffusion in each world cultural domain.

In sum, this study examines how different world cultural ties—world polity (CEDAW) and world society (WINGOs)—promote women's rights norm diffusion to local attitudes in developing countries, while accounting for the direct and mediating effects of national-level compliance (quotas). Figure 1 summarizes this line of inquiry graphically.[10]

DATA AND METHODS

To test this model, I employ multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression on a survey of 40,898 individuals in 31 developing nations in 2013. Multilevel modeling assesses how national-level (L2) characteristics predict individual-level (L1) responses while accounting

for clustering, allowing analysis of both levels simultaneously (Rabe-Hesketh and Skron-dal 2012).[11] The intraclass correlation coefficient[12] suggests that between-group variance accounts for 18 percent of total model variance, indicating the utility of multilevel modeling.

I also perform a series of robustness checks assessing endogeneity and alternate explanations. The results could stem from self-selection, with individuals predisposed to join or support WINGOs, or gender-friendly nations inclined to ratify CEDAW. I account for this by examining diffusion to those unlikely to positively skew the results: individuals reporting little or no confidence in women's organizations (Pandian 2018 also uses this strategy), and late CEDAW ratifiers. I assuage concerns regarding model specification given the low country N relative to included predictors by repro-ducing results in a simplified model. I also perform the analyses using an alternate WINGO measure. Finally, I test quotas' unique impact by examining alternative forms of compliance: women's representation and labor force participation. Despite these efforts, the cross-sectional design of this study makes it impossible to rule out reverse causality, so the results must be interpreted with caution: it remains possible that high egalitarianism increases WINGO ties, quota adoption, and CEDAW ratification. Still, this study remains an important foray into understanding diffusion to attitudes in developing nations.

Data

Individual-level data are from the sixth wave (2010–2014) of the WVS (Inglehart et al. 2014). I build on previous studies using multilevel modeling to analyze attitudes in WVS data (Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Jung 2008; Pandian 2018; Paxton 2007; Strabac and Listhaug 2008) by examining how world polity, world society, and national compliance impact gender egalitarianism in 31 developing nations[13] (see Tables 1 and 2 for descrip-tive statistics and nations analyzed).[14] I include sampling weights to account for selection probability.

Though a cross-sectional design has limitations, inconsistencies across survey waves make longitudinal analysis impossible. Because I focus on developing nations, few nations are consistently sampled across waves *and* asked the relevant survey questions ($N = 16$), making full model specification impossible given the small L2 N in relation to total predictors (14). Ignoring these issues would lead to invalid standard errors and tests of significance. Still, the WVS is advantageous (compared to other cross-national surveys) because it provides nationally representative, standardized data for nations across various income levels, cultures, and geographic regions.[15] I now discuss the variables analyzed.

Individual-Level Dependent Variable

Because I examine how world culture diffuses to gender-egalitarian attitudes, broadly conceived, I analyze survey responses to four statements of attitudes toward women across varying social spaces that together provide a comprehensive measure of beliefs: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women"; "Men make

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Country-level predictors					
International-level ties					
WINGOs	Count of a nation's ties to women's international non-governmental organizations (WINGOs)	63.352	30.456	12	114
CEDAW Duration	Count variable for number of years since ratification of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	24.623	6.220	15	33
National-level compliance					
Quotas	Dummy variable for national-level legislative gender quotas	0.472	0.499	0	1
Interactions					
WINGOs × Quotas	Interaction between WINGOs and Quotas	26.788	34.487	0	102
CEDAW duration × Quotas	Interaction between CEDAW Duration and Quotas	12.245	13.665	0	33
Controls					
Democracy	A regime authority spectrum capturing level of democracy	4.263	5.554	–9	9
GDP per Capita (logged)	GDP divided by midyear population count, in current US dollars	8.384	0.845	6.535	9.539
Women's Secondary Education	Gross enrollment ratio (ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age)	83.449	20.801	33.353	110.278
Individual–level controls					
Muslim	Dummy variable for Muslim religious denomination	0.305	0.461	0	1
Sex (female)	Dichotomous variable for sex of respondent	0.516	0.500	0	1
Education	Ordinal measure of highest level of education completed	2.827	1.189	1	5
Socioeconomic Status	Self-identified class	2.603	1.022	1	5

(continued)

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables (*continued*)					
Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Age	Respondent's age in years	38.956	15.285	16	98
Age-Squared	Squared term of age	1,751.179	1,374.004	256	9,604
Number of countries: 31					
Number of cases: 40, 898					

better political leaders than women do"; "Men make better business executives than women do"; and "University is more important for a boy than a girl." Though originally ordinal, I dichotomize each measure to avoid country-item bias[16] endemic to cross-national surveys, whereby individuals from different countries respond in systematically divergent manners, even if they have fundamentally equivalent beliefs—for example, certain nationalities avoid extreme responses, while others prefer them (Stegmueller 2011). I use 1 for gender egalitarianism (disagree or strongly disagree) and 0 for its absence (agree, disagree, or neither), thus eliminating non-random variability between responses and assessing the discrete presence of beliefs, rather than degree (which is highly country-specific). Others code WVS data similarly (Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Pandian 2018). To examine all questions simultaneously, I follow Pandian (2018) and sum all four answers to create a continuous summated scale (Cronbach's alpha = 68.86).[17]

Country-Level Independent Variables

I use several variables to examine how world polity, world society, and state compliance impact women's rights diffusion to individual attitudes. I include variables measuring nations' ties to world polity and world society institutions dedicated to women's rights, and quotas as a measure of compliance.

WINGOs follows in the sociological institutionalist tradition (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006) to count nations' WINGO ties (a tie exists where at least one citizen claims membership), therefore capturing citizen-based world society linkages. This operationalization investigates the theoretical expectation that organizations, rather than individual actors, establish global-institutional environments promoting compliance. Data come from the ICPSR dataset, Women's International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1950-2013 (Hughes et al. 2013).

CEDAW Duration is a count variable measuring states' CEDAW ratification duration in years, given CEDAW's near-universal ratification and the time necessary for diffusion (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Cole 2013; Jacob et al. 2014).[18] This captures not only CEDAW ratification or world polity tie *presence*, but also how long CEDAW has been mandated and thus tie *duration*.[19]

Quotas is a dummy variable from the IDEA Gender Quota Database (IDEA and Stockholm University 2019) measuring nationally mandated legislative quotas (quotas =

TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics by Country for 31 Countries

Country	Year quotas mandated	Year CEDAW ratified	CEDAW duration	Number of WINGO ties
Algeria	2012	1996	17	32
Argentina	1991	1985	28	102
Armenia	1999	1993	20	22
Belarus		1981	32	27
Brazil	1997	1984	29	102
China	2007	1980	33	51
Colombia	2011	1982	31	69
Ecuador	1997	1981	32	54
Georgia		1994	19	32
Ghana		1986	27	74
India		1993	20	114
Jordan	2003	1992	21	41
Kazakhstan		1998	15	18
Kyrgyz Republic	2007	1997	16	12
Lebanon		1997	16	46
Malaysia		1995	18	70
Mexico	2002	1981	32	89
Morocco		1993	20	47
Nigeria		1985	28	84
Pakistan	2001	1996	17	77
Peru	1997	1982	31	86
Romania		1982	31	69
Rwanda	2003	1981	32	38
South Africa		1995	18	104
Thailand		1985	28	66
Tunisia	2011	1985	28	41
Turkey		1985	28	72
Ukraine		1981	32	53
Uzbekistan	2004	1995	18	12
Yemen*		1984	29	14
Zimbabwe		1991	22	74

*Until 1990, Yemen was two separate states (North Yemen and South Yemen). On unification, South Yemen's CEDAW ratification of 1984, transferred to the newly formed state.

1, no quotas = 0).[20] I include national quotas (reserved and legal quotas) and exclude party quotas, given their different mechanisms of adoption (Bush 2011; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Krook 2009) and my emphasis on *national* policies.

Country-Level Controls

GDP per Capita (logged) is a continuous World Bank measure capturing nations' economic development in current US dollars, logged for skewedness. Studies suggest that development liberalizes attitudes, so higher GDP should be associated with greater egalitarianism (Bergh 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Democracy is an ordinal measure of governance from Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2019). Because social development and democracy increase support for gender equality (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2002) and women's political participation (Inglehart and Norris 2003), higher levels of democracy should improve gender egalitarianism. Though democracy and WINGOs are highly correlated ($r = 0.6652$), neither's VIF exceeds 2.5, indicating no problematic multicollinearity (Allison 2010).

Women's Secondary Education is a continuous World Bank control capturing women's gross secondary school enrollment as a proxy for women's status (Bollen, Glanville, and Stecklov 2001; Caldwell 1979; Shen and Williamson 1997), given that more opportunities and equality for women increase egalitarianism (Ingelhart and Norris 2003).[21] Although secondary education and GDP are collinear ($r = 0.7559$, VIF = 2.81 and 2.83, respectively), the main predictors do not suffer from multicollinearity.[22] Because these variables fulfill their purpose as controls and do not impact the main coefficients, I include both in the model as is (Allison 2010; Wurm and Fisicaro 2014).[23]

Although Muslim-majority countries are more likely to register reservations to treaties (Neumayer 2007) and oppress women (Cole 2013; Shah 2005), controls for *sharia* law were insignificant.

Interaction Terms

I interact international-level world polity and world society measures (CEDAW Duration and WINGOs, respectively) with national-level compliance (Quotas) to examine interactions across levels of diffusion. Because quotas foster especially visible, meaningful women's representation (Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012; Tripp and Kang 2008) and increase egalitarianism (Beaman et al. 2009; Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo 2010), they should facilitate compliance where international linkages are insufficient. Quotas, as an act of national-level state compliance, *in combination with* international-level ties, should reinforce international linkages.[24] *WINGOs × Quotas* accounts for interactions between world society ties and compliance. *CEDAW Duration × Quotas* accounts for interactions between world polity ties and compliance.

Individual-Level Control Variables

I control for several individual attributes from the WVS that might impact attitudes.

Gender is a dichotomous variable (women = 1, men = 0) accounting for women's higher egalitarianism compared to men (Beaman et al. 2009; Bolzendahl and Meyers 2004).

Socioeconomic Status is an ordinal self-reported measure (1–5: lower class, working class, lower middle class, upper middle class, upper class). Wealthier individuals tend to be more supportive of gender equality (Apparala, Reifman, and Munsch 2003; Schoon et al. 2010).

Education ordinally captures respondents' education (1–5: no education, primary school, secondary school, some college, college degree). Educated individuals are more likely to hold liberal views about women (Dreary, Batty, and Gale 2008; Schoon et al. 2010).

Age (respondent's age in years) is used to account for generational and cohort effects (Glenn 1980; Pampel 2011). *Age Squared* addresses nonlinearity.

Muslim is a dummy variable (Muslim = 1, else 0) measuring religion, because nations with higher proportions of Muslims demonstrate less support for gender equality and sexual liberalization (Cole 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2002; Shah 2005).

FINDINGS

I present my main findings in Table 3. Model 1 is the baseline, Model 2 includes the interaction WINGOs × Quotas, and Model 3 includes the interaction CEDAW Duration × Quotas. The first number in each set of three is the logged odds regression coefficient, the second is the odds ratio, and the third is the robust standard error. All VIFs not addressed above fell below 2.5 (Allison 2010), suggesting no additional multicollinearity issues.

In Model 1, CEDAW Duration has a positive and significant effect on attitudes, with individuals in nations with longer ratification periods being more likely to have gender-egalitarian attitudes. For each additional CEDAW Duration year, there is a 3.244% increase in the likelihood that respondents have gender-egalitarian attitudes, holding all else constant. Although small, this prediction represents the effect of just one additional year of CEDAW membership. As years pass, effects will accumulate. These findings support the expectation that world polity ties diffuse norms to attitudes.

Figure 2 plots the predicted margins for CEDAW Duration. The slope of the line is positive, indicating that as CEDAW Duration increases, egalitarianism increases. In relation to the sample range, while 15 years of ratification is associated with a 0.789 probability of having gender-egalitarian attitudes, 35 years is associated with a 0.871 probability. This suggests that although support for equality is generally quite high, world polity linkages via CEDAW are effective at transmitting global norms to attitudes.

Model 1 also indicates that state policies supporting women (quotas) are positive and significant. Compared to respondents in nations without quotas, respondents in nations with quotas are 65.54% more likely to hold gender-egalitarian attitudes, all else held constant. This confirms the importance of national compliance in increasing existing egalitarian attitudes and demonstrates the capacity for state behavior (specifically quotas) to transform beliefs.

TABLE 3. Multilevel Analysis Examining the Influence of World Culture on Gender Egalitarian Attitudes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Country-level predictors			
WINGOs	0.003	–0.006	–0.0002
	1.003	0.993	1.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
CEDAW Duration	0.0319*	0.015	–0.009
	1.032	1.023	0.991
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Quotas	0.504**	–1.110**	–1.717**
	1.655	1.084	0.180
	(0.184)	(0.385)	(0.590)
Women's Secondary Education	–0.001	0.0104	0.0005
	0.999	0.991	1.001
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Democracy	0.011	0.008	0.023
	1.011	1.048	1.023
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.020)
GDP per Capita (logged)	0.302	0.0736	0.1639*
	1.352	1.375	1.178
	(0.155)	(0.122)	(0.116)
Interactions			
WINGOS × Quotas		0.0258***	
		1.009	
		(0.006)	
CEDAW Duration × Quotas			0.088***
			1.092
			(0.022)
Individual-level predictors			
Gender (female = 1)	0.675***	0.674***	0.675***
	1.963	2.122	1.964
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)

(continued)

TABLE 3. Multilevel Analysis Examining the Influence of World Culture on Gender Egalitarian Attitudes (*continued*)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Muslim	-0.423***	-0.423***	-0.418***
	0.655	0.702	0.658
	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.095)
Education	0.198***	0.198***	0.198***
	1.219	1.274	1.219
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Socioeconomic Status	0.0134	0.0132	0.014
	1.013	1.041	1.014
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006
	1.006	1.001	1.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age-Squared	-7.15e-05	-7.24e-05	-7.05e-05
	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(6.18e-05)	(6.18e-05)	(6.20e-05)
Constant	-2.754***	0.079	-0.679
	0.064	0.104	0.507
	(0.831)	(1.176)	(0.825)
Number of countries	31	31	31
Number of observations	40,898	40,898	40,898
Wald chi-squared	414.72***	557.72***	394.87***

$*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001$ (two-tailed test).
Note: In each group of three numbers, the first is the coefficient estimate, the second is the odds ratio, and the third (in parentheses) is the robust standard error for the coefficient estimate.

Conversely, WINGOs are not significant, suggesting that world society alone does not influence gender-egalitarian attitudes in developing nations. These results differ from Pandian's (2018) significant WINGO effect for developing and developed nations. Yet these results are not contradictory; it appears that world society's diffusive capacity varies by level of development, suggesting that different mechanisms are at play in different developmental contexts.

Model 2 offers further insight. The positive and significant WINGOs × Quotas interaction (0.0258 slope adjustment) suggests that in nations with quotas, as WINGOs increase, egalitarianism increases. Yet the negative and significant Quotas moderator

FIGURE 2. Predicted Margins for CEDAW Duration

FIGURE 3. Predictive Margins for WINGOs by Presence of Quotas

suggests that this is not true across all WINGOs values. In nations with zero WINGO ties, egalitarianism is lower with quotas than without. However, no cases in the sample have zero WINGO ties (min. = 12); thus, this coefficient is not substantively meaningful. Figure 3 plots the predictive margins for WINGOs by quota adoption (all else at sample means), illustrating these trends. Circular predicted values (dotted line) denote quota presence; triangular denote quota absence (solid line). The vertical reference line denotes mean WINGO ties.

In examining the disaggregated WINGO trend lines by quota adoption in Figure 3, the upward-sloping dotted line suggests that WINGOs' effect on attitudes is positive when quotas exist, whereas the solid line indicates no WINGO effect where quotas do not exist. That is, the effect of WINGOs depends on the presence of quotas. As the

FIGURE 4. Predictive Margins for CEDAW Duration by Presence of
Quotas

diverging trend lines indicate, quotas' capacity to improve WINGO effectiveness in-
creases as WINGO ties increase, suggesting that quotas best amplify WINGO ties when
they exceed a certain threshold (approx. 60). Theoretically, this suggests that WINGOs
are incapable of diffusing global norms to attitudes directly (Model 1) and without quotas
(Model 2) but *become* effective when accompanied by quotas reinforcing the institutional
environment a sufficient number of WINGOs establish.

Below a certain WINGO threshold (23), the dotted line falls below the solid line,
indicating that attitudes are less egalitarian where quotas exist, compared to where they
do not.[25] However, the cases to which this applies (where WINGOs < 23) are few
(five), suggesting that the left side of the graph does not represent most of the nations
sampled. Still, this theoretically implies that quotas combined with few or no world
society ties may provoke resentment in the general populace, reducing egalitarianism.
Yet, as indicated by the vertical reference line, in developing nations with an average
number of WINGO ties (63), attitudes should be significantly more egalitarian where
quotas exist, compared to where they do not.[26] Thus, although quotas may be prob-
lematic when accompanied by few WINGOs, on the whole, they are a useful mecha-
nism for diffusion in *typical* developing nations and in *most* developing nations.
Overall, Model 2 suggests that quotas facilitate world-society-based attitudinal diffu-
sion at middle and high WINGO values, but may provoke backlash without sufficient
WINGOs to complement.

Model 3 produces similar results. The positive and significant CEDAW Duration ×
Quotas interaction (0.0878 slope adjustment) indicates that when quotas exist, as
CEDAW Duration increases, egalitarianism increases. Although the negative and signif-
icant Quotas coefficient indicates less egalitarianism when CEDAW Duration is zero
with quotas compared to without, no cases actualize this condition, suggesting that this
finding is not substantively meaningful. Figure 4 plots the predictive margins for

CEDAW Duration by quota adoption (all else at sample means) to illustrate these trends. Circular predicted values (dotted line) denote quota presence; triangular denote quota absence (solid line). The vertical reference line denotes mean CEDAW Duration.

In examining the disaggregated CEDAW Duration trends by quota adoption in Figure 4, the dotted line (quotas) has a much steeper, positive slope (0.0878 adjustment) compared to the relatively flat solid line (no quotas), suggesting that CEDAW Duration liberalizes attitudes with quotas, and has no effect without quotas. The diverging trend lines suggest that quota salience increases the longer CEDAW is ratified, particularly beyond 20 years. In contrast to Model 1, whereas predicted probabilities for egalitarianism increase from 0.8 to 0.85 across the range of CEDAW Duration, where quotas exist, probabilities increase from 0.75 to 0.93. This suggests that although CEDAW Duration alone increases egalitarianism (Model 1) and egalitarianism is relatively high, quotas further augment these effects (Model 3), increasing CEDAW's influence on attitudes, again indicating that national compliance (quotas) facilitates diffusion.

Although the quotas line drops below the no-quotas line for short CEDAW Duration, implying less egalitarianism with quotas compared to without, at the minimum CEDAW Duration (15 years) there is no significant difference in attitudes.[27] Thus, unlike WINGOs, quotas do not produce tangible backlash effects on attitudes in shorter periods. Also, the higher trend intersection for quotas vs. no quotas at the vertical black reference line (24.623) indicates that attitudes in nations with average CEDAW Duration are significantly more egalitarian where quotas exist, compared to where they do not.[28] Although quotas matter little at CEDAW Duration's lower bound (15 years), they augment CEDAW's effects on attitudes in *typical* developing nations, and do so increasingly as time passes. In sum, Model 3 suggests that quotas further bolster direct world polity influences on attitudes.

All the models suggest (1) that world polity and world society do not equally impact attitudes, and (2) that quotas improve the effects of both. Whereas CEDAW alone increases egalitarianism, WINGOs do not, indicating differences in state vs. citizen-based mechanisms. Although quotas have negative effects or no effect at low levels of world cultural integration, all models demonstrate their mostly positive moderating role, particularly when global linkages are sufficient. Thus, interactions between global ties and national compliance work best *together,* when they can reinforce each other's aims and legitimacy. Importantly, predicted baseline egalitarianism across models is relatively high,[29] which may reflect successful world cultural influence prior to 2013. *The major takeaway of these results is that diffusion to attitudes varies by linkage type, and quotas are most beneficial when combined with a* strong *presence of global linkages.* All together, these results demonstrate the complex impact on diffusion of interactions between global ties and national compliance.

Finally, controls indicate that GDP is insignificant, surprisingly suggesting that economic development does not liberalize attitudes in developing nations. Democracy and women's education are also insignificant, suggesting that social progress—generally and for women—is insufficient. As expected, being female and educated increases egalitarianism, while being Muslim decreases it. Age is insignificant, suggesting no cohort effects.

I perform several robustness checks to validate my findings. Given local actors' role in diffusion (Brysk 1993; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), endogeneity is possible: perhaps WINGOs' positive effect (with quotas) is caused by self-selection (i.e., individuals predisposed to support WINGOs and their promotion of gender equality are driving WINGOs' effects). To allay these fears, I follow Pandian (2018) and present alternative models that (1) control for individual confidence in women's organizations, and (2) examine diffusion to respondents who, given their low confidence in women's organizations, are probably not interested in joining WINGOs or receptive to their goals. These analyses thus evaluate WINGO impact (facilitated by quotas) on individuals unlikely to drive the results (Table 4).

As expected, respondents reporting confidence in WINGOs are significantly more likely to have egalitarian attitudes, indicating some predisposition to egalitarianism. Yet this alone does not explain WINGO impact: the main findings hold when controlling for confidence and in samples restricted to individuals expressly cynical about WINGOs and, by extension, their objectives. This suggests that world culture sways even the disinclined and reinforces the argument that WINGOs' effect (facilitated by quotas) is *not* merely due to a preexisting propensity to join WINGOs or support their cause. For statistical power, I maintain the full sample in my main models.

I also examine state-driven endogeneity: early-ratifying "gender-friendly" states could be driving CEDAW's effects. To address this concern, I include a pre-1990 ratification dummy (early ratification = 1, late ratification = 0), determined by the bimodal ratification distribution (Figure 5).[30] Because CEDAW Duration and early ratification are highly collinear, I separately examine early ratification (Table 5). Across all models, the original findings hold: early ratification is not significant, indicating CEDAW's relevance irrespective of states' bias.

The surprising insignificance of women's education and democracy suggests that otherwise significant effects are being masked by too many L2 predictors in a small L2 sample. In a simplified model containing only control variables, secondary education and democracy remain insignificant and individual-level controls hold, suggesting proper model specification (Table A2 in the appendix).

I also examine alternate measures. Using Lee's (2018) WINGOs data on all models, the results substantively hold, suggesting robustness to WINGO measures (Table A3 in the appendix).[31] Other compliance measures besides quotas could also facilitate diffusion: women's representation and women's employment.[32] But neither of these measures or their interactions reach significance (Table A4 in the appendix), indicating that quotas, which may garner additional legitimacy as a formal and highly visible state mandate prioritizing women's rights, are uniquely effective for diffusion (Phillips 1995).

DISCUSSION

World polity and society's unique effect on diffusion are often conflated (Cole 2017). Yet the strategies and structures underlying state vs. citizen world cultural diffusion are

TABLE 4. Multilevel Analysis Examining the Influence of World Culture on Gender Egalitarian Attitudes Controlling for Confidence in Women's Organizations

	Model 1 Full sample	Model 1 Restricted sample	Model 2 Full sample	Model 2 Restricted sample	Model 3 Full sample	Model 3 Restricted sample
Country-level predictors						
WINGOs	0.003	0.002	-0.007	-0.004	-0.0008	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
CEDAW Duration	0.032*	0.027	0.015	0.017	-0.009	-0.014
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.003)
Quotas	0.518**	0.443*	-1.102**	-0.563	-1.675**	-1.784**
	(0.180)	(0.173)	(0.384)	(0.428)	(0.585)	(0.637)
Interactions						
WINGOS × Quotas			0.026***	0.016*		
			(0.006)	(0.006)		
CEDAW Duration × Quotas					0.087***	0.0882***
					(0.022)	(0.025)
Individual-level controls						
Confidence in Women's Organizations	0.179*		0.179*		0.178*	
	(0.087)		(0.087)		(0.087)	
Full set of controls from Table 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of countries	31	31	31	31	31	31
Number of observations	40,898	16,503	40,898	16,503	40,898	16,503

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
Notes: In each group of two numbers, the first is the coefficient estimate, and the second (in parentheses) is the robust standard error for the coefficient estimate. Other predictors are omitted for brevity, but the original results substantively hold.

FIGURE 5. Distribution of State Ratification of CEDAW by Year

distinct, particularly in developing nations (Beckfield 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). CEDAW and WINGOs have different effects on the diffusion of women's rights to attitudes. And although direct diffusion from global to local is central to institutionalism, we must also consider the direct role of state policies and their mediating effects, given recursive diffusion patterns (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). This is especially salient for women's rights, considering states' interference in diffusion (Fallon, Aunio, and Kim 2018; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015) and quotas' ability to facilitate it (Beaman et al. 2009; Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo 2010). My findings reflect these assertions and build on previous work to clarify our understanding of norm diffusion. Although we cannot identify causality, we can speculate about why world society and world polity effects differ, and why quotas are especially useful.

Linkage Type

Most fundamentally, this study demonstrates world society's and world polity's unique impacts on attitudes. While CEDAW fosters egalitarianism, WINGOs do not, suggesting that states' and citizens' world cultural ties are not equivalent and should be differentiated. Surely, states and citizens employ different toolkits for change.

For citizens, if certain populations or nations are systematically excluded from WINGOs, their effectiveness will decrease—and developing nations remain peripheral in INGO networks (Beckfield 2003). INGOs cannot promote norms where linkages are absent, and INGOs with low network centrality or influence may have particular difficulty (Hughes et al. 2009). Subnationally, INGOs that support ineffective norm translators (Merry 2006),[33] fail to sway the broader public, or do not reach influential domestic elites capable of obstructing them (Risse 2002, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) will also struggle. Because "transnational networks normally involve a small

TABLE 5. Multilevel Analysis Examining the Influence of World Culture on Gender Egalitarian Attitudes Controlling for Early Ratification of CEDAW

	Model 1 original	Model 1 with control	Model 2 original	Model 2 with control	Model 3 original	Model 3 with control
Country-level predictors						
WINGOs	0.003	0.004	-0.006	-0.006	-0.0001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Quotas	0.504**	0.533**	-1.110**	-1.174**	-1.717**	-1.644***
	(0.184)	(0.193)	(0.385)	(0.386)	(0.590)	(0.568)
CEDAW Duration	0.032*		0.015		-0.009	.0461
	(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.018)	(.038)
Early Ratification		0.297		0.083		-0.687
		(0.203)		(0.187)		(0.508)
Interactions						
WINGOS × Quotas			0.026***	0.027***		
			(0.006)	(0.006)		
CEDAW Duration × Quotas					0.0878***	0.084***
					(0.022)	(0.021)
Full set of controls from Table 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of countries	31	31	31	31	31	31
Number of observations	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Notes: In each group of two numbers, the first is the coefficient estimate, and the second (in parentheses) is the robust standard error for the coefficient estimate. Other predictors are omitted for brevity, but the original results substantively hold. *Model 3 with control* ran CEDAW and Early Ratification in the same model to preserve the purpose of the robustness check, but interpret this model with caution, given the high collinearity between these two variables.

number of activists" and "rarely involve mass mobilization" (Keck and Sikkink 1998:95), WINGOs may only reach select individuals, not the public at large.

Unlike citizens, states have a wealth of resources and media at their disposal that help transmit relevant narratives (Fallon, Aunio, and Kim 2018). States seeking legitimacy via CEDAW ratification (regardless of intent to conform) would likely use these resources and undertake publicity campaigns to garner domestic support and international recognition. Even if it is only lip service, a symbolic commitment to gender equality by a legitimate political body may be enough to change beliefs.

Quotas

National factors (quotas) are also important, directly and indirectly. In addition to providing women access and exposure, quotas represent states' commitment to women's rights, formalize the process through which women enter politics, and legitimize their participation in the public sphere. Quotas therefore represent a highly visible state commitment that also facilitates women's meaningful inclusion in traditionally male-dominated spaces. As more women access the political realm and pass laws promoting gender equality, the public is more likely to view women as agentic and competent, further dismantling traditional beliefs. These underlying processes may explain quotas' main effects.

Interactions and Complex Diffusion

The results also demonstrate the complexities of diffusion, with interactions between quotas and global linkages confirming the salience for attitudes of interactions between levels (Brysk 1993; v). Positive interactions between quotas and global institutions suggest that where direct global influence is insufficient, state compliance facilitates or amplifies its effects. Quotas may prime citizens for gender equality, making them more receptive to global scripts. These results also refine our understanding of positive interactions, indicating that above and below are not the *only* forms of effective combined pressures, and that individuals, like states, conform better when pushed from multiple fronts. Yet global and national pressures must *both* be *sufficiently* present for this to occur. Although global ties and quotas liberalize attitudes at average and high levels of integration, when WINGO ties (and less applicably, CEDAW Duration) are too low, quotas may have a negative or null impact—likely because they lack enough of the normative backing global organizations provide.

These findings illuminate the importance of establishing a comprehensive foundation for change. Quotas only become relevant at higher WINGO and CEDAW values; they require a minimum level of global engagement to build on. Similarly, too few WINGOs may be unable to draw on changes in the political landscape (quotas) to promote egalitarianism. It may be that quotas (and their after-effects) are the tangible example around which WINGOs rally. Quotas may help WINGOs get their foot in the door— but only when enough WINGOs knock. Similarly, without enough time for CEDAW to normalize, quotas do little to augment it. In fact, without ample global presence, quotas may produce "recoiling effects"—especially for WINGOs—which further speaks to the

consequences of INGO network exclusion (Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015). It appears that interactions across levels of diffusion are not altogether positive and work best when sufficiently applied *together* (i.e., quotas exist *alongside* ample global ties). Thus, simultaneous examination across several levels of influence is important for understanding attitudes. We must consider how and under what circumstances global, national, and local factors and the various domains in which they operate work with and against one another to promote diffusion.

Additional Considerations

Still, these conclusions should be considered cautiously: it is important to remember that nations whose citizens are more egalitarian are also more likely to have many WINGO ties, to ratify CEDAW, and to enact quotas. However, previous research indicates this study's causal ordering may be correct. Although egalitarianism could spur quota adoption, the passage of major legislation such as quotas or CEDAW is often filtered through state-dominated channels, predicated on political access points, or deliberately shelved by elites (Fallon, Aunio, and Kim 2018, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). State accession without local value coherence is common, implying that diffusion to opinions occurs after formal adoption, if at all (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2008). Conversely, considerable public support for global norms is often insufficient for policy change. Nevertheless, alternative explanations remain possible.

Future studies can address this concern as additional waves emerge that better speak to the causal effect of world culture and quotas on attitudes in developing nations. Scholars can also build on these findings to more precisely trace diffusion among nations not represented by WVS data or examine diffusion to attitudes in other issue areas. Variation in attitudes about women in varying roles also remains underexplored. Finally, scholars can examine alternate forms of CEDAW (e.g., signature vs. ratification, Optional Protocol), as the mechanisms of diffusion may vary by agreement stringency.

CONCLUSION

This first cross-national quantitative study of women's rights norm diffusion to attitudes in developing nations finds that world society (WINGOs) and world polity (CEDAW) do not uniformly promote gender egalitarianism. CEDAW fosters egalitarianism when given time to diffuse, while WINGOs alone do not change attitudes. WINGOs are only significant when abundant in number and in places with quotas, suggesting that national compliance can facilitate the transmission of norms to attitudes. Quotas also augment CEDAW's effects, indicating the importance of compliance even where global actors are already successful. Quotas alone are also significant, demonstrating how policies can change beliefs. But where global integration is low, quotas may have negative or null effects, suggesting that compliance works best alongside a strong global institutional environment.

Most centrally, this study demonstrates the complexity of global norm diffusion. Diffusion occurs not as a "trickle-down" process but slowly and unevenly. Despite

embodying normative scripts, global institutions are not the only, or the most effective, norm promoters. National policies are also key for compliance. Future studies can further unpack how and why quotas are especially effective and extend this framework for understanding world cultural diffusion more generally. ∎

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NOTES

1. Other multilevel WVS analyses have a similar N (Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Paxton 2007).

2. Defined as "the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in . . . congruence with local beliefs and practices" (Acharya 2004:245).

3. E.g., a "rising tide" of gender equality or shifts from traditional to secular-rational values (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

4. This does not imply equality among nations, only less inequality. See Wallerstein's (1979) world-systems theory for work on global inequality.

5. Though domestic factors remain important, international linkages are the most relevant for women's rights (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997).

6. Non-ratifiers: United States, Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, Tonga.

7. These are known as "spiral" or "boomerang" models. Boomerang patterns occur when domestic and international actors lobby the state. Spiral models result from several boomerang throws (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

8. By the 1990s, quotas became a common mechanism for cultivating women's representation (Krook 2006), and they now signify modernity (Towns 2010). As of 2019, about 130 nations have quotas. See the IDEA Database for updated statistics (IDEA and Stockholm University 2019).

9. *Reserved seats* designate a number/proportion of seats for women; *legal candidate quotas* mandate a percentage of female candidates; *political party quotas* reserve space in parties.

10. This figure illustrates pathways specifically highlighted in this paper; it does *not* suggest that other pathways do not exist or that reverse causality is not possible.

11. Clustered observations lack independence, causing heteroskedasticity and biased estimates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).

12. This measures how severely clustering impacts the dependent variable.

13. Originally there were 32 countries, but the Philippines was influential and is excluded from final analyses.

14. Nations are considered "developing" if they are not a World Bank "high-income economy": they include low-income (< USD 995 gross national income per capita), lower-middle-income (USD 996–3,895), and upper-middle-income (USD 3,896–12,055).

15. Other surveys (e.g., the International Social Survey Programme) target high-income nations. Region-specific surveys (e.g., Global Barometer Surveys) do not allow cross-region comparison.

16. Defined as "differences in response behavior that are not due to true attitudinal differences but the result of country specific (non-random) measurement error" (Stegmueller 2011:471).

17. Logistic regression of each item renders some variability. However, because I examine diffusion to egalitarian attitudes (broadly conceived), the scale provides a more representative breadth of attitudes. Alternative three-item scales reduce Cronbach's alpha, indicating lower internal consistency. I thus use the full scale in the main results.

18. CEDAW Duration Squared examined nonlinearities, but the results were not meaningful or significant. I also considered weighting CEDAW by ratification "risk" based on year of formal sovereignty, but I decided against this because non-sovereign nations still ratified CEDAW, and to account for nations' unique historical experiences shaping their decision to ratify even after formal sovereignty (Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012).

19. CEDAW Ratification (binary) is not significant, even when operationalized strictly, where nations registering CEDAW reservations permitting legal gender discrimination are classified as not ratified, and those with reservations not undermining CEDAW's primary goals are classified as ratified (Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012). I also examined Optional Protocol (1999) ratification and strict CEDAW duration, but, following previous literature, I focus on CEDAW's main effects rather than comparing forms of ratification.

20. I examined quota duration given short vs. long-term quota effects. Results generally hold with some variation, suggesting that quota *duration* is also salient for diffusion to attitudes and that exposure explanations hold true.

21. Alternative measures of women's status (representation and employment) rendered substantively similar results, both as substitutes for education and as additional controls. Following previous literature and to preserve validity, education remains the primary women's status control.

22. See Table A1 in the appendix for the correlation matrix.

23. Residualizing collinear variables does not change effects size and can produce biased estimates of the non-residualized collinear variable. Scholars suggest using original predictors (Wurm and Fisicaro 2014; York 2012).

24. WINGOs × CEDAW Duration was not significant, reinforcing the importance of inter-actions *across levels* of diffusion.

25. Formally tested using centered variables.

26. Formally tested using mean-centered variables.

27. Formally tested using centered variables.

28. Formally tested using mean-centered variables.

29. Actual values vary by nation.

30. Because subsetting by ratification reduces the L2 nations to 14, causing misspecification and unreliable results, I control for ratification in the full sample.

31. No other WINGO measures extend to 2013. Berkovitch's (1999) end in 1999; Smith and Wiest's (2012) end in 2003.

32. World Bank measure of the percentage of seats in a single or lower chamber held by women; World Bank measure of the proportion of economically active women 15 and older.

33. Norm translators highlight commonalities between global norms and local contexts but are prone to "double-dealing" and may be undermined by local preferences and power structures (Merry 2006:38–40).

APPENDIX

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
TABLE A1. Correlation Matrix for All Independent Variables												
1	1.00											
2	0.109	1.00										
3	-0.204	0.202	1.00									
4	-0.044	0.130	0.028	1.00								
5	0.665	-0.012	-0.165	0.034	1.00							
6	0.126	0.186	-0.158	-0.756	0.084	1.00						
7	-0.376	-0.397	0.052	-0.164	-0.198	-0.131	1.00					
8	-0.048	0.006	0.013	0.0340	-0.038	0.033	-0.017	1.00				
9	-0.168	0.007	-0.045	0.170	-0.078	0.117	-0.094	-0.026	1.00			
10	-0.123	-0.066	-0.007	0.0220	-0.015	-0.015	0.078	-0.007	0.302	1.00		
11	-0.037	0.045	-0.024	0.171	-0.008	0.115	-0.083	0.009	-0.156	-0.054	1.00	
12	-0.039	0.054	-0.023	0.171	-0.004	0.115	-0.088	0.006	-0.158	-0.053	0.982	

Variables: (1) WINGOs, (2) CEDAW Duration, (3) Quotas, (4) Women's Secondary Education, (5) Democracy, (6) GDP per Capita (logged), (7) Muslim, (8) Sex (female), (9) Education, (10) Socioeconomic Status, (11) Age, (12) Age-Squared.

TABLE A2. Multilevel Analysis Examining the Influence of World Culture on Gender Egalitarian Attitudes, Simplified Model

	Full model (baseline)	Simplified model
Country-level predictors		
WINGOs	0.003	–
	(0.004)	–
CEDAW Duration	0.032*	–
	(0.015)	–
Quotas	0.504**	–
	(0.184)	–
Women's Secondary Education	–0.001	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Democracy	0.011	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.015)
GDP per Capita (logged)	0.302	0.216
	(0.155)	(0.180)
Individual-level predictors		
Gender (female = 1)	0.675***	0.674***
	(0.068)	(0.068)
Muslim	–0.423***	–0.428***
	(0.094)	(0.093)
Education	0.198***	0.197***
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Socioeconomic Status	0.013	0.013
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age	0.006	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age-Squared	–7.15e-05	–7.17e-05
	(6.18e-05)	(6.18e-05)
Constant	–2.754***	–1.585
	(0.831)	(1.180)
Number of countries	31	31
Number of observations	40,898	40,898
Wald chi-squared	414.72***	279.35***

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).
Note: In each group of two numbers, the first is the coefficient estimate, and the second (in parentheses) is the robust standard error for the coefficient estimate.

	Model 1 original	Model 1 WINGOs (Lee)	Model 2 original	Model 2 WINGOs (Lee)	Model 3 original	Model 3 WINGOs (Lee)
Country-level predictors						
WINGOs	0.003	0.008	–0.006	–0.014	–0.0002	–0.001
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Quotas	0.504**	0.474*	–1.110**	–1.113*	–1.717**	–1.728**
	(0.184)	(0.204)	(0.385)	(0.440)	(0.590)	(0.573)
CEDAW Duration	0.032*	0.032*	0.015	0.017	–0.009	–0.009
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Interactions						
WINGOS × Quotas			0.026***	0.063***		
			(0.006)	(0.017)		
CEDAW Duration × Quotas					0.088***	0.089***
					(0.022)	(0.022)
Full set of controls from Table 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of countries	31	31	31	31	31	31
Number of observations	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).

Notes: In each group of two numbers, the first is the coefficient estimate, and the second (in parentheses) is the robust standard error for the coefficient estimate. Other predictors are omitted for brevity, but the original results substantively hold. The WINGOs variable is represented by the Hughes WINGOs measure for all "original" models, and by the Lee WINGOs measure for all "Lee" models.

	Model 1 Representation	Model 1 Employment	Model 2 Representation	Model 2 Employment	Model 3 Representation	Model 3 Employment
Alternate Compliance Measures:						
WINGOs	0.003	0.003	0.004	-0.002	0.004	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
CEDAW Duration	0.035*	0.032*	0.035*	0.027	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.042)
Women's Representation	0.008		0.011		-0.046	
	(0.008)		(0.014)		(0.035)	
Female Labor Force Participation		0.006		-0.001		-0.014
		(0.005)		(0.010)		(0.024)
Interactions						
WINGOS × Compliance			-0.001	0.001		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
CEDAW Duration × Compliance					0.002	0.001
					(0.001)	(0.001)
Full set of controls from Table 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of countries	31	31	31	31	31	31
Number of observations	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898	40,898

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Notes: In each group of two numbers, the first is the coefficient estimate, and the second (in parentheses) is the robust standard error for the coefficient estimate. Other predictors are omitted for brevity, but the original results substantively hold.